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SMITH V. WADE: A GREEN LIGHT FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
Section 1983,' originally enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was an
effort by Congress to put teeth into the guarantees of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Section 1983 provides a federal forum for the redress of the "depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws." Although compensatory damages are routinely awarded in section
1983 actions where actual injury has been proven, the availability of puni-
tive damages has only been recognized in theory by the Supreme Court.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
In Smith v. Wade3 the Court for the first time squarely addressed the
appropriate circumstances for an award of punitive damages where a viola-
tion of plaintiffs constitutional rights has occurred. The central question
posed in Smith was whether actual malice on the part of the defendant is
required before punitive damages can be awarded, and if not, whether a
showing of some circumstances or conduct in excess of that needed to estab-
lish liability for compensatory damages is required.
This comment will outline the history of section 1983, define the consti-
tutional tort, discuss eighth amendment standards, and analyze damages in
the context of a constitutional tort. This comment takes the position that
punitive damages should be available in a proper section 1983 action where
either actual or implied malice on the part of the defendant is proven.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hzstooy of Section 1983
Section 1983 was originally enacted as section one of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. 4 The Act, commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was
enacted by Congress as an attempt to deal with widespread legal abuses and
physical violence perpetrated against southern blacks and union sympathiz-
ers. The Act represented an early exercise of congressional power under sec-
tion five of the fourteenth amendment to enforce the amendment's equal
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) reads in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
2. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.ll (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); cf Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (punitive damages available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)).
3. 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
4. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
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protection provisions. 5 The main goals of the legislation were: 1) to override
discriminatory state laws;6 2) to provide a remedy when state law was inade-
quate;7 and 3) to provide a federal remedy when the state remedy, although
theoretically adequate, was not available in practice.
8
The interpretation given section 1983 recently has been considerably
broadened. Early holdings, as evidenced in the Slaughterhouse Cases,9 were
quite restrictive, interpreting the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment as protecting only rights of national citizenship.'o
This interpretation was expanded slightly in 1939 when the Court held, in
Hague v. CIO. ,It that certain personal liberties were within the scope of
section 1983. Gradual recognition of the expanded scope of the fourteenth
amendment protections' 2 led to the Court's 1961 landmark decision in
Monroe v. Pape13 that a denial of fourteenth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures by a state official was actionable as a
section 1983 claim. Equally as important, Monroe also held that specific in-
tent to violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights is not required under section
1983,14 and that section 1983 is to be interpreted "against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of
his actions."'
15
5. Note, Section 1983 and Federahm." The Burger Court's New Directtin, 28 U. FLA. L. REV.
904, 905 (1976). The Constitution provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Section five of the fourteenth amendment further provides that,
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."
6. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 173 (196 1); overruled on the localgovernment immunity issue alone, Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
7. McNeese, 373 U.S. at 672; Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
8. McNeese, 373 U.S. at 672; Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174.
9. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
10. Among the limited rights of federal citizenship is the right to travel. Under this inter-
pretation, the fourteenth amendment did not reach the types of outrageous conduct by state
officials that inspired the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Gressman, The Unhappy
Histoy ofCivil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1330-37 (1952). See alro Note, Develop-
ments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1157-58 n. 130 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Developments].
11. 307 U.S. 496, 531-32 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (limiting the scope of§ 1983'sjuris-
dictional counterpart to non-property rights).
12. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment). See generally, S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES LITIGATION 37-38 (1979); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 567-
69 (1978); McClellan and Northcross, Remedies and Damagesfor Violation ofConstitutional Rights, 18
DuQ. L. REV. 409, 415-16 n.40 (1980) (rights incorporated by way of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment).
13. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
14. Id. at 187. The Court arrived at this conclusion by comparing § 1983 to its criminal
counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982), which had been interpreted in Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 103 (1945) to require "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." Al-
though intent was not a primary issue, both the majority and dissent concluded that specific
intent to deprive a person of a federally protected right is not necessary in a § 1983 action.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 206-07 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
15. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
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B. The Constitutional Tort
There are several reasons why Justice Douglas may have suggested in
Monroe that violations of constitutional guarantees be examined against the
backdrop of tort common law. Professor Katz has suggested that tort law is
used as a reference point because statements of causes of action in tort are
simple, traditional, effective and commonly understood means of redressing
harms to personal liberty interests. 16 In addition, Katz asserts that, espe-
cially in constitutional matters, a tort framework provides consistency in re-
quirements for causes of action and remedies, and is an effective method of
deterrence in that government officials may be held accountable for consti-
tutional violations.
17
In many instances, there is not a tort perfectly analogous to a constitu-
tional violation. Even when the common law and constitutional tort are
nearly identical,' 8 the differences in the purposes underlying tort law as op-
posed to section 1983 must be examined.
A plaintiff alleging a section 1983 claim must establish that she has been
deprived of a right secured by the federal Constitution and laws, by a de-
fendant acting under color of state law.1 9 Section 1983, however, is silent as
to the basis of liability, i.e., whether liability results from intentional or negli-
gent conduct, or even from conduct without fault.2 0 Tort liability requires a
determination of the duty owed the plaintiff, and the standard of conduct
against which the tortious act is to be measured. Consequently, in every
section 1983 case involving the deprivation of a constitutionally guaranteed
right, the constitutional duty and standard of conduct must be identified
and the constitutional policy considered.
2 1
Likewise, civil rights law allows for affirmative defenses which will insu-
late a defendant from liability where a constitutional tort has been commit-
ted. Absolute immunity from prosecution, afforded judges,22 legislators,
23
16. Katz, The Jursprudence of Remedies. Constitutional Legalit and the Law of Torts in Bell v.
Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1968).
17. Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted).
18. For instance certain fourth amendment violations very closely parallel the common
law torts of assault and battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern,
407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.) (false imprisonment), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
19. See generally, Note, Section 1983-A Change in the Meaning of Under Color of Law: Polk
County v. Dodson, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 151 (1983); Note, Section 1983 Liability of Private Actors Who
Conspire With Immune State Oftcials, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 802 (1980); Comment, The Supreme Court
Corrals a Runaway Section 1983, 34 MERCER L. REv. 1073 (1983) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme
Court Corrals a Runaway].
20. Section 1983 does indicate however, that the defendant's conduct must cause the "dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." Thus, in Kish v.
County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971), the court found that prison assaults re-
sulted not from defendants' breach of their eighth amendment duty, but from the construction
of, and overcrowding in, the jail.
21. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L. J. 5, 13 (1974).
Cf Cox, Constitutional Duty and Section 1983. A Response, 15 VAL. U.L. REV. 453 (1981) (duty
analysis necessary, but relevant duty is not constitutional, but rather a statutory duty, albeit
punctuated by constitutional values). But see, Note, Section 1983 Liabilityfor Aegligence, 58 NEB.
L. REV. 271, 285 (1979) ("The constitutional duty approach does not, however, appear to pro-
vide a more definitive standard for determining liability under section 1983 than existing
standards.").
22. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349. 356-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
1984]
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and prosecutors, 24 will defeat a section 1983 action at the outset, provided
the defendant official acted within the scope of her duties. Other govern-
ment officials may avoid liability by pleading qualified immunity, the so-
called "good-faith defense".
25
The Supreme Court first recognized the availability of the good-faith
defense in Pierson v. Ray. 26 The Court indicated that just as a police officer
could defend against a common law action for false arrest by proving that
she acted reasonably and in good faith, such a defense was also available in a
section 1983 action. 27 Wood v. Strickland,28 a case in which students alleged
due process violations by a school official, further defined the particulars of a
good-faith defense, holding that good faith must exist both objectively and
subjectively. The objective test would impose liability where it could be
shown that the defendants had not, under the circumstances, acted in good
faith.2 9 The subjective standard would require proof that the defendant had
acted maliciously. 30 A further refinement of the qualified immunity defense
occurred in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,3 1 a case which held that presidential aides
are entitled to qualified (but not absolute) immunity. While most commen-
tators feel that Harlow eliminated the subjective prong of the qualified im-
munity test 32 as articulated in Wood v. Strickland,33 it is unclear whether this
is a thorough interpretation of the Harlow34 language.
However, if a judge acts "in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction' " he will be subject to liability.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)).
23. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
24. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
25. The terms "qualified immunity" and "good-faith defense" are interchangeable. See
Laverne v. Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally, McClellan and North-
cross, supra note 12, at 454-59; Nahmod, supra note 21, at 26-30; Rushing and Baxter, Section
1983 Defenses, 14 URB. LAW. 149, 154-56 (1982); Note, Developments, supra note 10, at 1210-13.
26. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
27. Id at 556-57.
28. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
29. Id at 314.
30. Id at 322.
31. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
32. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 n. 14,
7-8 n.53 (1982); Note, Remedies-Immunity--President absolutely Liable From Civil Damages Liability
For Ofjiial Acts-Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2690 (1982); Presidential Aides Entitled to Quahfled
Immunity From Civil Damages Liability For Oftiial Acts-Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727
(1982), 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 374, 391 (1983); Comment, Immunity.- Eliminating the Subjective
Element fom the Qualified Immunity Standard in Actions Brought Against Government Ofials, 22 WASH-
BURN LJ. 577, 587 (1983).
33. 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975). The Court in Harlow states that: "[r]eferring both to the
objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if
an official 'knew or reasonably shouldhave known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action
with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitution rights or other injury...' " 102 S.
Ct. at 2737,quoting Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). After noting
that the subjective element of the Wood qualified immunity test "frequently has proved incom-
patible with our admonition. . . that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial" (Harlow,
102 S.Ct. at 2737), and that "bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government
officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore
hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 2738 (citations
omitted).
34. A plausible interpretation of the Hlarlow decision regarding the appropriate standard
[Vol. 61:4
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C Cruel and Unusual Punishment-The Eighth Amendment
The eighth amendment 35 prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment is one of the constitutional guarantees without a direct counterpart in
tort law. Claims of cruel and unusual punishment, most often made by pris-
oners of a correctional facility, often look to the law of negligence for gui-
dance.36 In a negligence case, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
foresaw or should have foreseen an unreasonable risk that his conduct would
invade another's protected interest. 3 7 Negligence involves the departure
from a standard of conduct determined by weighing the probability that
harm will occur, the gravity of such harm, and the cost of avoiding the risk-
creating conduct. 38 The constitutional duty that a defendant owes to the
plaintiff, usually a prison inmate, is that the defendant not subject or cause
the inmate to be subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment. 39 This duty
can be violated by either an affirmative act on the part of the defendant, or
by an omission on her part. In Estelle v. Gamble40 the Supreme Court held
that a violation of the standard of conduct prescribed by the eighth amend-
ment occurs when one commits acts or omissions sufficiently harmful as to
evidence deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
4 '
Thus, the plaintiff in Estelle was required to demonstrate deliberate or cal-
lous indifference to his serious medical needs, rather than mere substandard
care. 42 While prison authorities are not guarantors of the inmates' safety,
there exists a constitutional right to protection from attacks by fellow in-
mates.4 3 Thus, where a prison official knows or should have known of the
high likelihood of an assault on an inmate, and does nothing to prevent such
an assault, the nonfeasance of the official constitutes an actionable violation
of the prisoner's eighth amendment rights.
44
for qualified immunity is that both an objective and subjective test be applied; however, the
objective test would be the "primary" or "threshold" (Harlow, 102 S.Ct. at 2739) requirement.
Thus, only if the objective "knew or should have known" standard was met, would inquiry into
the official's subjective state of mind be permitted. See also id. at 2740 (Brennan, Marshall, &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring) preserving, in some instances, an inquiry into the subjective state of
an official's level of knowledge; Nahmod, supra note 32 at 8 n.53.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments afflicted."
36. See, e.g., Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 528 (10th Cir. 1979); Parker v. McKeithen,
488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
37. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 145-49 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
38. W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 145-49.
39. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) ("incompatible with evolving standards of
decency", citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292,
1294 (E.D. Va. 1972) ("intolerable to accepted notions of decency"); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d
970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965) ("of such character or consequences as to shock general conscience or to
be intolerable in fundamental fairness.").
40. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
41. Id at 104.
42. Id at 106.
43. See Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292, 1294; Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir.
1971); Parker v. McKeithen, 330 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. La. 1971); Note, Decency and Fairness.: An
EmergingJudtcial Role 6? Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv. 841, 858 (1971).
44. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1976); Spence v. Staras, 507
F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974); Parker v. McKeithen, 330 F. Supp. 435, 437 (E.D. La. 1971).
19841
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D. Damages
Section 1983 gives no indication of what types of damages are to be
awarded for constitutional violations, or how such damages are to be mea-
sured. Section 1988,1 5 however, specifically authorizes the use of common
law remedies in section 1983 actions. Common law tort rules of damages
cannot always provide a complete solution to the damages issue in a section
1983 case. 46 The damages should reflect compensation for a deprivation of
the protected interest, 47 and are meant to provide a consistent remedy, i.e., a
remedy unaffected by differences in tort law from state to state.48 Compen-
satory damages, meant to compensate the aggrieved party for the injury suf-
fered, may be awarded in section 1983 actions.49 In the absence of proof of
actual injury, however, the courts have refused to allow more than nominal
damages;50 no recovery is allowed solely for the loss of a constitutional
right. 5'
The availability of punitive damages in tort law has been justified his-
torically as a means of "redressing affronts to personal feelings not suscepti-
ble of measurement, financing deserving litigation where only small
compensatory damages can be expected, diverting [a] plaintiffl's] desire for
revenge into peaceful channels, and serving as a punishment for and deter-
rence from socially disapproved conduct."'52  In Carey v. PzphusS 3 the
Supreme Court made it clear that the main purpose of damages in a section
1983 action was compensation for actual injuries suffered. 54 The Court also
45. The jurisdiction in civil matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions
of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the protec-
tion of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far
as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object; or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suita-
ble remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having juris-
diction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
46 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978).
47. Id. at 258-59.
48. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 ("prevailing view [of the common law] in this coun-
try.") See also Note, Developments, supra note 10, at 1211 n.126.
49. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 259-64; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
350 (1974); Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 528-31 (10th Cir. 1979).
50. Sve, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (procedural due process); Thompson v.
Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 1977) (parole revocation); Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33,
34 (1st Cir. 1973) (unreasonable search and assault).
51. Libel is an exception to this common law rule requiring proof of actual injury as are
certain forms of slander. See W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 751-77. Se also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 620-33 (1977).
Damages have also been presumed where plaintiff has been deprived of the right to vote. See
Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919). Several commentators have taken the position
that presumed damages should be allowed for plaintiff's loss of an inherently valuable constitu-
tional right. See generaly Love, Damages: A Remedy for Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 1242 (1979); Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v.
Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980).
52. Riley, Punitive Damages. The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 199
(1978) (citing Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967)).
53. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
54. Cf Nahmod, supra note 21, at 10. "The Supreme Court, however, emphasized in
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noted in Carey that exemplary or punitive, damages might be proper in a
section 1983 action to deter or punish violations of constitutional rights,
55
without expressly approving or disapproving lower court decisions56 award-
ing punitive damages. Another important purpose served by punitive dam-
age awards is that of vindication; 5 7 in view of the fact that damages are
generally not presumed for the deprivation of a constitutional right,58 the
importance of the vindicatory element of punitive damages is enhanced.
III. FACTS
Daniel R. Wade was an inmate at the Algoa, Missouri State Reforma-
tory for youthful first offenders. In the summer of 1976, Wade voluntarily
checked into Algoa's protective custody unit, available to inmates who, for
safety reasons, wish to be segregated from the general prison population.
59
During his stay in the protective custody unit, Wade violated some of the
unit's rules, and was disciplined by being placed in punitive segregation. On
October 27, 1976, Wade was transferred to the administrative segregation
unit and initially placed in a cell with one other prisoner.
William H. Smith is a guard at the Algoa Reformatory, and was re-
sponsible for placing a third prisoner, Thompson, into the administrative
segregation cell with Wade and his cellmate on October 27. The third in-
mate had been sent to administrative segregation for fighting, and it had
been recommended that he be isolated for his own safety and that of the
other prisoners. Shortly thereafter, both inmates began to harass Wade, and
eventually beat and sexually assaulted him.
As a result of the assault, Wade brought suit under section 1983 against
Smith and four other guards and correctional officials, alleging that his
eighth amendment rights had been violated. Wade asserted that Smith and
Monroe that even where the plaintiff has adequate resource against a state official under state
law, the 1983 remedy is still available, indicating that compensation is not currently thought to
be the major function of section 1983."
55. 435 U.S. at 257 n.l 1. Both the punishment and deterrent functions are strengthened
by the ability of the court to take into account the defendant's financial circumstances. See D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 3.9 (1973). See also Project, Suing the Police in
Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 809-14 (1979) (empirical study suggesting that § 1983 damages
have very little deterrent effect). Punitive damages, however, are often deemed uninsurable, D.
DOBBS, supra § 3.9; Comment, Insurancefor Punitite Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L. J.
431 (1977); Burrell and Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1978).
56. 435 U.S. at 265.
57. See Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Such awards may be
particularly appropriate as a means of vindicating the public interest in preventing violations of
civil rights by state officials."); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965) (punitive damages
serve the congressional purpose of "vindicating civil rights in civil suits."). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1982), which explicitly recognizes the vindicatory function of § 1983, supra note 45.
58. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. Cf Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. at 1639
n.21 ("Moreover after Carey punitive damages may be the only significant remedy available in
some § 1983 actions where constitutional rights are maliciously violated but the victim cannot
prove compensable injury," citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 n.9 (1980)).
59. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 1981). At this time Wade was eighteen
years old, five feet, eight inches tall, and weighed approximately 130 pounds. Due to his small
stature, Wade would qualify, in prison parlance, as a "pretty boy". See Punitive Damages in Section
1983 Actions: The Eighth Circuit's Requirement of Malicious Intent, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 898, 917
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Pumtmie Damages].
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the other defendants knew or should have known that under the circum-
stances an assault was likely to occur because: 1) Wade previously had
placed himself in protective custody due to prior incidents of violence
against him by other inmates; 2) although there was another cell in the ad-
ministrative segregation unit available with only one other inmate, Wade
was placed in a cell with two prisoners from the general prison population;
60
and 3) only a few weeks earlier, another inmate in the same unit had been
beaten to death during Smith's shift.
The district court upheld the trial court's instruction that punitive dam-
ages could be assessed against Smith if he was found to have acted recklessly,
with callous disregard of, or indifference to Wade's rights of safety.6 ' Smith
was found to harbor no ill will or spite (actual malice) toward Wade; the
Eighth Circuit judge thus implied malicious intent from Smith's reckless and
callous disregard of known dangers.
62
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision, holding that either actual malicious intent, or reckless indif-
ference to the rights of others, would justify an award of punitive damages in
a section 1983 action.63 Additionally, the majority held that the standard
for punitive damages need not be higher than the underlying standard of
liability for compensatory damages. 64
IV. SMITH V WADE
The theoretical availability of punitive damages in a "proper" section
1983 action was never an issue in Smith v. Wade, 65 despite the absence of
authority in the statute itself. The primary issue, and the reason for granting
certiorari in this case, was to decide what standard of conduct would justify
an award of punitive damages.
66
The Supreme Court had indicated in Carey v. Pphus6 7 that "malicious
intent" on the part of the defendant would be required to justify an award of
punitive damages. The majority in Wade found that a malicious intent
could be manifested either as reckless indifference to or callous disregard of
60. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d at 781.
61. Id. at 784.
62. Id at 786.
63. 103 S. Ct. at 1637. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined. Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissenting
opinion.
64. Id at 1639. The Court noted further that the deterrent purpose of punitive damages
was not harmed by the standard of liability being the same for both compensatory and punitive
damages, and that the standards enunciated for awards of compensatory and punitive damages
under § 1983 did not depart from the common law rules.
65. Id at 1628-31,cting, inter alia, Brief for Petitioner at 8, Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625
(1983). Cf id at 1629-30 n.5, where Justice Brennan notes that Justice Rehnquist's dissent
"without squarely denying that punitive damages are available under § 1983, does its best to
cast doubt on the proposition."
66. Id at 1627.
67. 435 U.S. at 265 (punitive damages not awarded because petitioners found not to have
acted with "malicious intention").
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the plaintiffs constitutional rights, as well as by actual malicious intent. 68
The dissent defined malicious intent in a more restrictive manner, requiring
evidence of ill will or spite to prove the presence of actual malice. 69 The
majority and dissent reached these separate conclusions often relying on the
same cases for support.70 This irony is largely due to the varying and often
imprecise labels used to define damages standards.
A related issue decided in Smith v. Wade is whether the standard of lia-
bility for exemplary damages must be higher than the standard of liability
for compensatory damages under section 1983. Again receiving no guidance
from the statute, the Court looked to the common law of torts, noting that
the common law has never required that the threshold for punitive damage
liability must be higher than that for compensatory liability. 7' The majority
cited with approval the purposes of punitive damages (punishment and de-
terrence) in relation to the violation of a plaintiffs constitutionally guaran-
teed rights. 72 While recognizing that the recklessness standard is somewhat
ambiguous, Justice Brennan did not find it so vague as to be unfair or not
useful. 73 The Court rejected Smith's argument that recklessness was too
vague a standard to enable potential defendants to conform to the law and
avoid the proposed sanctions, 74 finding such reasoning valid only assuming
that prison officials would base their conduct on the punitive damage
standard.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Traditional Tort Analysts
1. Duty owed
Mindful of the "background of tort liability" 7 5 against which section
1983 actions should be examined, the analysis in a section 1983 case begins
with constitutional right/duty considerations. Based on prior eighth amend-
ment cases, it is clear that there are two ways in which the "accepted notions
of decency" 76 standard of the eighth amendment can be violated. First,
prison inmates collectively have the right to exist in a prison environment
where violent assaults are the exception, rather than the rule; and second,
the deprivation of an eighth amendment right happens when an egregious
failure to provide for the security of a particular inmate occurs. 77 Implicit in
the description of the second possible eighth amendment deprivation is the
assumption of a certain level of knowledge by prison officials of the circum-
68. 103 S. Ct. at 1631-37.
69. Id at 1642-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Arms, 91
U.S. 489 (1875); Philadelphia, W. & B. R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202 (1858); Day v.
Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
71. 103 S. Ct. at 1638.
72. Id. at 1639.
73. Id. at 1637.
74. Id. at 1636.
75. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 187.
76. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
77. Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292, 1294 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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stances of a specific prisoner. 78 It would clearly be unfair to charge a prison
official with an egregious failure to protect a particular inmate if the official
had no knowledge, or reason to suspect that the prisoner was in danger.
Once the requisite level of personal knowledge is (or should be) present, how-
ever, the constitutional duty to protect an inmate, wherever possible, 79 from
violence is activated.
2. Standard of Conduct/Breach of Duty
In examining the appropriate standard of conduct to which prison offi-
cials should aspire, past eighth amendment decisions have attempted to ac-
count for the fact that a prison sentence is, in itself, a punishment.8 0 The
difference, then, between the punishment evidenced by a prison sentence,
and the prohibited cruel and unusual punishment, is the requirement of
proof by the plaintiff that the prison official intended8 ' the violation of his
eighth amendment rights.
This was the position taken by the circuit court in Wade v. Haynes; 82 the
court cited as authority Schaal v. Rowe, 83 where the Seventh Circuit Court
required an inmate to show that a prison official had deliberately deprived
him of his constitutional rights in not preventing an attack by another in-
mate.8 4 "Deliberate deprivation may result from actual intent to deprive
him of rights or from recklessness in ignoring known threats."8 5 This stan-
dard of conduct was also upheld in Estelle v. Gamble,86 where "deliberate
indifference" to a prisoner's serious medical needs was held to state a cause of
action under section 1983.87
B. Qualifed Immunity
The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of malicious intention in
the context of the qualified immunity defense in Procunier v. Navarette.88 The
78. See Punitite Damages, supra note 59, at 918.
79. "In determining whether a given act or omission by prison authorities rises to the level
of deprivation of the right to security, the Court takes notice of the violent nature of the men
who inhabit . . .prisons." Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. at 1294.
80. People v. Upchurch, 76 Cal. App. 3d 721, 143 Cal. Rptr. 113, 114 (1978); In re Baker,
183 Misc. 113, 50 N.Y.S.2d 431, 433 (1944); Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598, 33
N.E. 648, 649 (1893).
81. See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 32, at 23. "[In Roberts v. Williams] [t]he Fifth Circuit
may have been concerned with the possibility of numerous 1983 claims based on alleged eighth
amendment violations if use of the eighth amendment were not limited to extreme situations
involving intentional conduct. Thus it appears that, for § 1983 purposes, unintentional conduct
may not constitute an eighth amendment violation . . ." Cf McClellan & Northcross, supra
note 12, at 440 n.163. "The eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment prohibition
[in] the prison context. . .[does] not depend on the state of mind of the actor." Id at 451-
52. "The defendant's state of mind should not control the determination of whether a right
[secured by specific provisions of the Bill of Rights incorporated into the due process clause-
such as eighth amendment rights] has been violated."
82. 663 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1981).
83. Schaal v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ill. 1978).
84. Id at 157.
85. Id, cting Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 n.8 (7th Cir. 1977).
86. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
87. Id at 105.
88. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
[Vol. 61:4
SMITH v. WADE
Court, through its reliance on section 8A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS,8 9 seems to require proof that an official either actually intended
harm to the plaintiff, or took an action which, although not intended to
harm, was so likely to produce injury that the harm was certain to result. 90
In other words, malicious intent is found by examining the defendant's in-
tention in causing the act which resulted in the deprivation, rather than
examining the act itself. The plaintiff therefore must prove that the prison
official intended the act which violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, or
that the official acted with reckless disregard of whether she was violating
such a right.
This analysis is necessary where an eighth amendment violation has
been alleged, despite the Court's recent pronouncement in Harlow v. Ftzger-
ald.91 In Harlow the Court held "that government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or con-
stitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' 92 Nu-
merous cases, 93 including the 1976 Supreme Court decision, Estelle v.
Gamble94 have held that implied malicious intent, characterized as "deliber-
ate indifference", 95 or "callous indifference" 96 would state a valid cause of
action against prison officials under section 1983. Therefore, even if Harlow
did eliminate the "subjective" prong9 7 of the qualified immunity defense,
proof that a prison guard had acted with malicious intent, either actual or
implied, 98 would defeat the immunity defense "since a reasonably compe-
tent public official should know the law governing his conduct." 99 In sum-
mary, because the law regarding the standard of conduct necessary to state
an eighth amendment deprivation is well-settled, failure to abide by that
standard will defeat even the "objective"' 00 prong of the good-faith immu-
nity test.
C Standard of Liabiity
The question the Court addressed in Smitlh o. Wade examines the suffi-
ciency of an implied malicious intent standard with regard to the imposition
of punitive damages. The majority in Smith v. Wade determined that the
standard of conduct required to defeat the immunity defense will also justify
the imposition of punitive damages, where implied malicious intent was the
basis for both compensatory and punitive damages in the lower court. ° i
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977).
90. 434 U.S. at 566.
91. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
92. Id at 2738 (citations & footnotes omitted).
93. See supra footnotes 82-85 and accompanying text.
94. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
95. Id. at 105.
96. Fiedler v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1979).
97. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
98. See Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979).
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2739.
100. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
101. 663 F.2d at 784-86.
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As Justice Brennan initially points out, even though the standards
which justify awards of compensatory or punitive damages are described by
the same words, they are not identical. Once liability is established, imposi-
tion of compensatory damages against the defendant is mandatory. Punitive
damages, on the other hand, "are never awarded as of right, no matter how
egregious the defendant's-conduct."' 10 2 The decision in this case regarding
the award of exemplary damages was an expression by the jury that Smith's
conduct seemed to them outrageous.
The question remains, however, whether the standard articulated for an
award of punitive damages should be higher than for compensatory dam-
ages. The dissent cites numerous reasons why the more stringent actual mal-
ice requirement is appropriate as a prerequisite to an award of punitive
damages, among them that punitive damages have always been viewed with
disfavor.10 3 Justice Rehnquist also expressed fears that quasi-criminal puni-
tive damages would be awarded without adequate safeguards in civil ac-
tions, and that punitive damages would be awarded capriciously by jurors,
especially where the standards forming the basis of the award are vague.1
0 4
Further, the dissent contends that, at least where the standards are ill-de-
fined, the costs of punitive damages, such as the encouragement of unneces-




Although it is true that punitive damages are not a "favorite in the
law", 10 6 it is equally true that punitive damages have been awarded in the
past, and continue today to be assessed where the court feels that their deter-
rent or vindicatory purposes are served."-07 The dissent insists that a reckless-
ness standard is too vague for a jury to base a quasi-criminal award of
punitive damages, apparently overlooking the fact that the recklessness stan-
dard is also used to describe criminal violations, such as manslaughter. 10 8
Concern is expressed that punitive damages will be awarded against
unpopular defendants, producing a possible chilling effect on officials' devo-
tion to duty. While it is certainly possible that punitive damages may be
awarded by a jury prejudiced against a defendant official, an equally plausi-
ble theory is that the jury's sympathies will be with the prison official, who
may be perceived as a hard working employee trying to make the best of a
bad situation, and who will certainly have severe problems satisfying a large
102. 103 S. Ct. at 1638.
103. Id at 1641 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. Id (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. Id at 1641-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. Id at 1641 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. Historically, punitive damages are thought to be as old as the right to trial by jury. 25
CJ.S. Damages § 117(1) (1966). Some courts have suggested they would be willing to award
punitive damages whenever they would serve a deterrent function. Keker v. Procunier, 398 F.
Supp. 756, 768 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (dictum); Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303, 1306 (S.D. Ohio
1975) ("where the conduct is found to be willful or wanton or where a deterrent effect will be
accomplished.").
108. Brief of Respondent at 4, Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983).
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damage judgment. 10 9 Further, the concern that the "Damoclean sword" of
potential punitive damage awards may undermine the "ability of officials to
take decisive, efficient action" would seem more than adequately protected
by the Court's recent qualified immunity pronouncements. While it may
appear at first glance that the majority requires only a showing of reckless-
ness," 0 this contention is amply refuted by an examination of the objective
portion of the qualified immunity test-that an official knew or reasonably
should have known that his or her actions would violate a clearly established
constitutional right. III
Viewed against the backdrop of other section 1983 cases, Smith v. Wade
appears as a logical next-step in a continuing progression. In Monroe v. Pape,
the Supreme Court explained that section 1983 actions should be viewed
against the background of tort liability. Wood and Navarelte provided an out-
line of the proper standard of conduct against which an official afforded a
qualified immunity could measure her actions. Although sketchy, the CareY
v. Piphus requirement of malicious intention transposed over Justice Bren-
nan's views on punitive damages in Adickes v. Kress, 1 12 lead logically to the
Court's statement in Smith v. Wade that the malicious intention required for
punitive damages may be manifested as either actual malice or as reckless
disregard of known dangers.
Prior decisions in common law tort cases regarding standards for impo-
sition of punitive damages are not unequivocably supportive of the Court's
holding. It seems safe to say, however, that the rule in the great majority of
jurisdictions was that punitive damages could be awarded without actual ill
will, spite, or intent to injure being shown.'' 3 Inquiries into the legislative
intent of the 42d Congress regarding the propriety of punitive damages are
even less definitive."14
109. Note, Developments, supra note 10, at 1225-26.
110. See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IA. L. REV. 1, 6-7,
10 (1982). In a discussion of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 532-35 (1981), Nahmod states that
" ... the Court concluded that negligent conduct could be a proper basis of liability in section
1983 cases." Thus, in the absence of a qualified immunity, reckless conduct would clearly state
a § 1983 cause of action, based on the Parratt holding. The cases are distinguishable because, in
addition to the qualified immunity defense in Wade not plead in Parratt, another important
difference between these two cases involving prison inmates exists; the 1983 claim in Parratt was
based on a fourteenth amendment due process claim, while the alleged violation in Wade was of
an eighth amendment right. The Paratt Court held for the defendant, finding that, although a
deprivation under color of law had occurred, the plaintiffs due process rights had not been
violated, as he was afforded a post-deprivation due process hearing.
11. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. The statement of the dissent that punitive
damages could be awarded on the basis of mere negligence is not entirely accurate. 103 S. Ct. at
1657 n.16.
112. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). "To recover punitive damages, I believe a plaintiff must show more
than a bare violation of § 1983. It is sufficient for plaintiff to show . . . that the defendant
acted with reckless disregard of whether he was violating such a right." 1d.
113. 103 S. Ct. at 1632. But cf. id at 1650 n. 10 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
114. One commentator has suggested that a strict or "historical" interpretation of the intent
of the 42d Congress would limit § 1983 actions to "racial problems" alone, while a "functional"
approach would recognize actions for violations of all constitutional rights. Neither interpreta-
tion expressly ratifies punitive damages, although a good case for the imposition of punitive
damages can be made under either approach. See Eisenberg, Section 1983. Doctrinal Foundations




In her separate dissent, Justice O'Connor identifies the primary pur-
poses of section 1983 actions as compensation and deterrence.'1 5 Balancing
the chilling effect on the performance of duties by public officials, and the
"ever-increasing flood of section 1983 claims"' 16 as costs of punitive dam-
ages, against the deterrence of constitutional violations as a benefit, Justice
O'Connor found the costs attendant prospective awards of punitive damages
to be too high.
Admittedly, before punitive damages can be imposed in a section 1983
action under either the actual or implied malice standard, the qualified im-
munity of the defendant official must be overcome. As the majority notes," 7
the presence of the qualified immunity defense protects the need for discre-
tion in making day-to-day decisions. This discretion would seem to go a long
way toward dispelling the chilling effect the dissent fears. However, the fact
that a prison official's immunity is qualified and not absolute indicates that
the protected sphere of privilege can be exceeded. Given that public officials
are capable of committing recurrent constitutional violations, there is no rea-
son why the officials should not be liable for reckless misconduct on the same
basis as private citizens." 8 Additionally, the presence of insurance to cover
assessments of compensatory damages would seem to completely negate any
possible deterrent effect, absent punitive damages. The final "cost" factor
cited by both dissenting Justices is the overcrowding of the courts, a problem
that would be further exacerbated unless a very high standard was imposed
before punitive damages could be awarded.
While it is true that there have been an increasing number of civil rights
cases filed in the court system recently," 9 the dissents' argument appears
logically inconsistent. First, there exist numerous barricades to the mainte-
nance of frivilous actions, such as dismissal on the pleadings for failure to
state a claim, 120 and summary judgment, 12' and the cost to plaintiffs for
initiating suits and pursuing their claims.' 22 Where a section 1983 claim is
presented, especially one alleging the deprivation of eighth amendment
rights, the qualified immunity of the official must be overcome. Even when
all these hurdles have been cleared, punitive damages are never awarded as
clearly has been interpreted to provide a forum affording protection of constitutionally guaran-
teed rights, especially where violated by state officials. See Wade, 103 S. Ct. at 1640 n.23. Cf
103 S. Ct. at 1658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. 103 S. Ct. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981)); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. at 254-57.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. 103 S. Ct. at 1639-40.
118. Love, supra note 51, at 1276.
119. See Note, The Supreme Court Corrals a Runaway, supra note 19, at 1075 n.24; Note, Section
/983 Liabtdityfor Negligence, supra note 21, at 274 n.22. "Between 1961 and 1979, non-prisoner
civil rights cases filed in federal district courts increased from 296 to 13,168; state prisoner filings
in federal courts showed a similar jump, increasing from 218 in 1966 to 11,195 in 1979." (foot-
notes omitted) Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 523.
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
122. Note, Developments, supra note 10, at 1222.
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a matter of right.' 23 Second, a survey' 2 4 of the range of punitive damages
allowed by lower federal courts in section 1983 actions indicates that the
awards normally do not exceed $10,000, and often consist of much smaller
sums. 125 Given the various procedural obstacles a plaintiff must surmount,
the uncertainty of any award of punitive damages, and the fact that punitive
damages are awarded only for egregious deprivations of constitutional
rights,' 26 it would seem that cases where the potential for punitive damages
exist are exactly the type of meritorious actions which should be encouraged
(rather than denying awards of punitive damages to prevent an ever-increas-
ing flood of section 1983 claims, which will threaten the ability of the federal
courts to handle those that are meritorious). 12 7 Finally, an empirical
study' 28 of section 1983 cases filed in 1975 and 1976 in the Central District
of California (Los Angeles) 12 9 concluded that the sheer volume of section
1983 cases pose no serious threat to the federal court system, noting that oft-
quoted statistics130 on the volume of cases in all likelihood are seriously over-
stated. The study also found evidence that courts generally view section
1983 actions with disfavor, despite the presence in the vast majority of cases
of "classic rights of obvious importance."'
3'
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Wade, when placed in perspective, reaffirms the protec-
tions afforded valuable constitutional rights, privileges and immunities de-
lineated in Monroe. When interests as important as constitutional rights are
at stake, the argument for the punishment and deterrence of persons who
engage in reckless conduct seems compelling. When integrated with the
Court's standard of conduct decisions in Wood, Navarelte, and Harlow, and
past eighth amendment decisions, Smith v. Wade's potentially vague reckless-
ness standard crystallizes quite clearly to define the breach of duty necessary
to merit an award of punitive damages.
The Wade outcome is troubling only as it reflects a continuing division
on the Court as to the proper uses of section 1983 litigation. Although ar-
guably based on a misperception' 32 of the current burdens of section 1983
litigation on the federal courts, the fear that Smith v. Wade will open the
123. See Riley, supra note 52, at 201 (generally, punitive damages are not given as a matter
of right, but as a matter of grace or gratuity.). See also Wade, 103 S. Ct. at 1638.
124. See Love, supra note 51, at 1275 n.274.
125. See generall Annot., 14 A.L.R. FED. 608 (1973) (punitive damages in actions for viola-
tions of federal civil rights). Wade was awarded $5,000 in punitive damages.
126. 103 S. Ct. at 1628. The trial court instructed the jury that Wade could only recover if
the defendant was grossly negligent or guilty of "egregious failure to protect Wade." Id.
127. Id. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. See Eisenberg, supra note 114.
129. Eisenberg's findings appear consistent with other empirical studies. id. at 525 n.182.
130. Id. at 523 n.175, and 533-36. Statistics collected by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts do not distinguish between civil rights cases brought under § 1983 and
cases brought under other civil rights statutes. Currently, employment claim cases constitute a
huge fraction of all civil rights cases. Id at 533 n.230.
131. Id at 536-37.
132. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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floodgates leading to a torrent of frivolous actions appears the most likely
explanation for the closeness of this decision.
Lynn Hahn
